"Fundamentalisms" qualified (1)
In this first of a two-part article, the writer reviews the history of the troubled use of the words ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘fundamentalisms’.
July 2005
While many women’s rights activists may avoid the over-used and often vaguely defined term, ‘fundamentalism’, most of us can agree that those political movements that have been lumped together under the general rubric of ‘fundamentalism’ share the common trait of undermining women’s rights and claiming to do so for religious reasons. Accordingly, it is important that we not allow conceptual and linguistic issues to prevent us from pursuing collective strategies against these very real threats to our rights.
For this reason, we must either develop new terminology to discuss right-wing religio-political movements and ideologies or accept the deeply flawed, but well-known term, ‘fundamentalism’. We can also use the plural ‘fundamentalisms’ to reflect common usage, while explicitly acknowledging the heterogeneous nature of fundamentalist ideologies from different religious traditions and varied socio-political contexts.
The term ‘fundamentalism’ first came into use in the early years of the 20th century to describe those who opposed the liberalisation of Christian theology that was taking place in the mainstream protestant Christian denominations of the United States. The name seems to have been derived from 12 pamphlets published and widely circulated between 1909 and 1912 that were entitled, The Fundamentals of Faith. The pamphlets were written by various authors who shared a common rejection of liberal theology and historical analysis of the Bible.
While the fundamentalists were primarily concerned with doctrinal issues, they ventured into politics to oppose secularism and the teaching of Darwinian evolution in public schools. In 1925, the fundamentalist leader Williams Jennings Bryan led the prosecution of a schoolteacher for having taught the evolution of species in a public school.
Although Bryan won the case, fundamentalists suffered greatly from the media scrutiny that it brought upon them. As a result, by the 1930s the term ‘fundamentalism’ came to connote anti-intellectualism and extremism. Even today only a small sub-set of those Christians who ardently defend the inerrancy of the Bible would refer to themselves as fundamentalists.
Since the 1970s and 80s, a time in which the Protestant evangelicals in the United States were organising politically and Muslim religio-political groups were growing rapidly in popularity and militancy, the term ‘fundamentalist’ has enjoyed popular use as a pejorative label to be applied rather loosely to any conservative group that is perceived by the labeller to be threatening to his or her own interests.
Indeed, the Western press has appropriated the term ‘to refer most often to Muslim groups and to invoke an instant apprehension of Islam itself as threatening, violent, and irrational’ (Lynn P Freedman, ‘The Challenge of Fundamentalism’(pdf formtat), WLUML Dossier 19, October 1997 (Grabels, France: WLUML, 1997), p. 98).
Because of both the Christian origin of the term and the scornful, insulting tone in which it has been most often applied to Muslims, Muslim religio-political groups generally do not embrace this label when describing themselves for non-Muslim audiences. Indeed, in contexts where ‘fundamentalist’ carries a negative connotation, such Muslim groups usually prefer to use the term ‘Islamist’ to describe themselves.
However, these same groups and/or individuals may choose to refer to themselves as ‘fundamentalist’, or some direct translation of that term, if doing so in a particular context would imply that they are simply ‘people who go by the principles’ or ‘people who go by the basics’. (The Arabic and Urdu terms for fundamentalists can be translated as ‘people-who-go-by-the-principles’ and ‘people-who-go-by-the-basics’ respectively.)
Whether we choose to use the term fundamentalist or Islamist or to reject both terms because of their misleading implications (i.e. that Islamist ideologies are essentially Islamic or that Islamic fundamentalists are expressing the fundamentals of their religion), we cannot afford to fail to distinguish between these groups and mainstream Muslims in such a way that we effectively conflate Islam with self-described ‘Islamist’ or ‘fundamentalist’ ideologies.
Not only does such a mistake contribute to silencing all other voices within the Muslim community, particularly those advocating for human rights generally, and women’s rights in particular; but it also reinforces the erroneous and dangerous stereotype that all Muslims are violent, irrational potential terrorists.
Such stereotypes, whether they are conveyed by the constant coupling of ‘fundamentalist’ and Muslim or by the failure to distinguish between militant extremists and the vast majority of Muslims, create dichotomised images that heighten tensions between ‘Western’ and ‘Muslim’ peoples and governments, strengthening the hands of right-wing groups on all sides of existing and potential conflicts.
"Fundamentalisms" qualified (2)
In this second of a two-part article, the writer examines several criticisms in order to develop a conceptual framework that offers some cohesion to the term ‘fundamentalisms’, a term that will most likely be used among us for the foreseeable future.
As the term ‘fundamentalism’ became more popular, so also did the groups and ideologies being so described. By the late 1980s and early 1990s scholars and activists from many different regions became interested in analysing this seemingly global phenomenon in which religio-political groups from numerous traditions were gaining political strength and popular support.
Perhaps the most well known scholarly effort concerning this trend has been The Fundamentalism Project (a comprehensive study sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences), a group effort resulting in five volumes examining Protestant Christian, Catholic Christian, Jewish, Sunni Muslim, Shia Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Confucian, and Shinto fundamentalisms.
After much deliberation, the editors of these volumes concluded that there are enough significant ‘family resemblances’ among these varied religio-political movements to warrant the use of at least an umbrella term. (The concept of ‘family resemblances allows interested parties to discuss fundamentalisms without necessarily constructing a definitive definition. Instead, they can use a clustering of common characteristics.)
Taking into account numerous alternatives and their potential defects, the editors decided to use the firmly entrenched popular term ‘fundamentalist’ as a descriptive term while stipulating that the noun form should be plural to reflect the variety of phenomena being grouped together.
They identified the following characteristics as being frequently shared by fundamentalisms: 1) reactivity to the marginalisation of religion; 2) selectivity; 3) moral dualism; 4) absolutism and inerrancy; 5) millennialism and messianism; 6) elect membership; 7) sharp boundaries; 8) authoritarian organisation; and 9) behavioural requirements (Martin E Marty and R Scott Appleby (eds.), Fundamentalisms Comprehended (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 405-14). While many activists and scholars employ this usage of ‘fundamentalisms’ as an analytical category, we add to the list of family resemblances an implicit or explicitly articulated patriarchal agenda.
Because in many contexts the term fundamentalist has become largely synonymous with bigotry, unthinking adherence, narrow-mindedness, and fanaticism, it is sometimes used to describe dogmatism even when the ideology in question is entirely secular in nature. For example, recently the phrase ‘market fundamentalism’ has become quite widely used to describe the belief that economic problems of all types and in all contexts are best solved through the unfettered activity of free markets. In his book, Globalization and Its Discontents (2002), the Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz provides a comprehensive critique of this type of ideology and its disastrous effects on developing economies.
Many have since employed the term ‘market fundamentalism’ to describe the type of thinking that Stiglitz describes. While this combination of terms has been very effective for attracting attention to this ideology and its negative effects, such a ‘fundamentalism’ is only tangentially related to the phenomenon we are challenging here. While the religio-political groups that we are referring to as ‘fundamentalisms’ may frequently employ policies that support international capitalism, their political imposition of patriarchal and absolutist interpretations of religion and their focus on personal and collective identity are what create particular challenges for women, minorities, and those affirming different versions of the same religion.
Additionally, because fundamentalisms are generally movements that identify selective aspects of modernity as threats to the identities of their adherents (and their reluctant co-religionists as well), it would be conceptually misleading to include overly zealous champions of a particular aspect of modernity among them.
Many scholars oppose the use of the term fundamentalism even when describing phenomena with an overtly religious component because the term fundamentalism implies that the group in question is following the fundamentals of their religion, that is, the authentic and true version of their religion. Such an implication is ironically false given that one of the key characteristics of fundamentalisms is their tendency strategically to select certain aspects of their religious traditions while choosing to ignore others.
As Lynn Freedman points out, because of this false implication, the term fundamentalism borders ‘dangerously on misnomer’ (Lynn Freedman, ‘The Challenge of Fundamentalism’, WLUML Dossier 19, October 1997 (Grabels, France: WLUML, 1997), p. 99). Similarly, others argue that the root word ‘fundamental’ causes problems when it is translated across languages and cultures because people may assume that they are fundamentalists simply because they agree that one should follow the fundamentals of their religion.
As Farida Shaheed explains, such translation problems ‘give a certain legitimacy to precisely those forces that we are trying to combat’ (Interview with Farida Shaheed, ‘Fundamentalisms–A South Asian Perspective’, WHRNET: Challenging Fundamentalisms, November 2003.)
Some fear that the negativity that the word carries renders the term at best, rude and at worst, dangerous. As Harris notes, in varying circumstances ‘people have been called fundamentalist in order to justify killing them, or destroying their property, or overthrowing their government’ (Harriet A Harris, ‘How Helpful Is the Term “Fundamentalist”,’ Christopher H Partridge (ed.), Fundamentalisms, p.3). As Shaheed points out, this label is often reserved only for those who are anti-Western, even though like-minded groups who serve Western political interests are described by the same observers as ‘traditional’ or even as ‘freedom fighters’.
Similarly Gita Sahgal and Yuval-Davis note ‘the spectre of fundamentalism has been used selectively in areas like the Middle East by both Israel and the US. All those who object to Pax Americana can be tarred with the fundamentalist brush’ (Gita Sahgal and Nira Yuval-Davis, ‘The Uses of Fundamentalism’, WAF Journal no. 5 1994, pp.7-9). Consequently, activists who use the label ‘fundamentalist’ to describe their opponents, however much they may abhor the manipulative uses of the term described above, may find themselves inadvertently reinforcing the link that Islamists seek to establish between imperialism and feminism.
Others argue that grouping together religio-political phenomena from different traditions and contexts emphasises superficial similarities while de-emphasising crucial differences. As Harris points out, so-called fundamentalisms may or may not be scripturally based (as they are in Abrahamic traditions); they may or may not be overtly politically active; they may or may not be violent; they may or may not be revolutionary.
Indeed, many fundamentalisms are strongly patriotic while others are radical protest movements that claim a liberating agenda. However, as Yuval argues, we cannot fail to differentiate between liberation theologies and anti-imperialist fundamentalisms. The former cooperates with other political freedom struggles while the latter subjugates such struggles. It is fundamentalisms’ common aversion to pluralism that makes them similar even while espousing varied political ideologies and agendas.
While the many criticisms of the term fundamentalisms make its use highly problematic, it still serves a vital purpose if it contributes to a greater understanding of the particular ways that those who claim religious moral authority can complicate identity politics and limit women’s strategic bargaining power for their rights. ‘Fundamentalisms’ expediently describes the worldwide rise in right-wing religio-political movements and ideologies.
However, if we are going to employ this term to describe those phenomena that we are challenging, we need to be very clear about our meaning. We are not challenging private, freely chosen religious convictions of any type from any tradition.
What we are instead concerned with are ‘modern political movements which use religion as a basis for their attempt to win or consolidate power and extend social control’. As Gita Sahgal and Nira Yuval-Davis argue, it is important to use a term that is not specific to one tradition, one that appeals to a sense of common experience, not so we can deny difference in context and circumstance, but so we can mobilise a coalition to fight for our rights. For now that term is fundamentalisms.
Third World Network Features
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About the writer: Kathleen McNeil is co-editor of Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML) Dossier.
The above article originally appeared in ‘Fundamentalisms – A Web Resource for Women’s Human Rights’ (26 April 2004), a joint project of the Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID), Rights and Democracy, and Women Living Under Muslim Laws (www.wluml.org).
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